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Abstract
In 1939, General Francisco Franco rose to power as a result of his victory in the Spanish Civil
War. The Spain he ruled over was war-torn and fractured, grieving over lost loved ones and
burning towns. As he looked to repair Spain, Franco turned to education. He entrusted the
Catholic Church to administer his new curriculum which looked to accomplish one goal:
indoctrinate Spanish youth into a new generation of National-Catholic sycophants. Although this
goal seemed sound, Franco and his disciples failed to build upon their foundational legitimacy,
which I argue was the fear and terror inflicted upon the public during the war. As the century
churned on, growing numbers of young Spaniards, not frightened of Franco as their parents
were, began to dissent. This protest encouraged the Church to divorce itself from the Franco
regime and its educational strategy. I argue that the split between the Franco Regime and the
Catholic Church in the realm of educational policy was fostered by the lack of historical memory
surrounding the Spanish Civil War. Furthermore, I argue the regime failed to establish a
historical narrative of the Civil War through education, which created a void that was filled with
dissent. My thesis draws on a powerful combination of firsthand accounts and government action
to create a clear timeline of educational policy in the Franco regime. In other words, I undertake
a thorough examination of both oral history testimony and statutory actions by the Franco regime
to support my claims. The study of Franco’s educational policy through the lens of historical
memory provides what I feel to be a useful model for Spanish historians looking to inform
modern debates raging in Spain.
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Introduction
In 1927, Spanish dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera needed a Director of the General
Military Academy located in the Aragonese capital of Zaragoza.1 Traditionally, Spain’s armed
forces had been trained in four separate academies for cavalry, artillery, infantry, and engineers.2
The new academy sought to consolidate these disciplines, Primo de Rivera also sought to address
another issue when he established the General Military Academy: mounting dissatisfaction with
his rule within Spain’s army.3 Primo de Rivera concluded that he had to appoint a general to this
post who would keep his nose out of politics, but he needed a general who was quietly right wing
sympathetic in order to ensure that the new director would enforce a strict code of loyalty to the
Spanish state. Primo de Rivera chose General Francisco Franco.
Franco was not a prototypical general. He stood merely five foot four inches tall, with a
round face and a squeaky voice. Born to an alcoholic naval officer who referred to him as
“Francesca” and a devout Catholic mother, Franco was tormented by his peers throughout his
youth and rise to prominence in the Spanish Army.4 His classmates in military school called him
“Franquito,” which means “little Franco.” They bullied him mercilessly by hiding his books or
tying him up and tossing him from his bed late at night.5 Franco did not excel in his studies,
finishing 251st out of 312 cadets.6 After a few mainland posts, Franco, to his delight, was
deployed to Spanish Morocco, where he looked to achieve long sought respect. Franco gained
prestige during his time in North Africa by displaying commendable, though often exaggerated,
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valor.7 Skeptical of farfetched tales of Franco’s exploits, his superiors did notice his talents as a
leader. All of these factors contributed to Franco’s rise to become the youngest general in any
European army at his appointment in 1926.8 Despite his shortcomings, Franco was able to rise to
the top of Spain’s armed forces quickly, leading him to become Primo de Rivera’s top choice to
run his new military academy.
Franco traveled to Zaragoza to oversee the preparation of new facilities that were being
constructed for the class due to arrive in the fall of 1928.9 One might suspect that Franco sought
to teach his cadets innovative approaches to contemporary European warfare. The rest of the
continent’s powers were modernizing their militaries through modern technologies and
innovative strategies. However, the future dictator looked to instill in officers the ideals that went
on to define his regime: physical valor, decisiveness, Catholic-based moral values, nationalism,
toughness and absolute loyalty. For example, instead of updated military tactics, Franco taught
his cadets traditional horsemanship. Franco’s cadets embraced their teachings, as 95% of former
Zaragoza students aligned with Franco during the subsequent Civil War.10 Franco’s time spent as
director of the General Military Academy foreshadowed his educational policy philosophy as
dictator: the state must promote a nationalistic and traditional values-based education in order to
mold young minds into wards of the national-Catholic Spanish state, with himself at its center.

7
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This thesis examines how the Franco Regime used education as a way to advance its
dictatorial goals and solidify its legitimacy. Franco attempted to create a baseline of support in
Spain’s youth but failed to establish a historical narrative of the Civil War through education,
which created a void that was filled with dissent. The lack of historical narrative of the Civil War
was significant because most adults who survived the conflict were terrified of Franco because of
his brutality, thus, solidifying his power over Spain. However, when Spaniards who did not
remember the war came of age, space emerged for political dissent, leading the regime to
question the effectiveness of Catholic-centered instruction, thus curbing the Church’s influence
educational policy.
Franco failed to construct his legitimacy through education because he was unable to
build upon the foundation which that legitimacy was based upon: fear. Although the regime
attempted to implement new laws aimed at fixing the faults in the education system, which this
thesis will examine in depth, it became apparent with each passing generation that came of age
that Franco could not convince the Spanish public that authoritarianism was an adequate mode of
governance. These generations did not remember him as a brutal tyrant, but viewed him as an
increasingly remote and irrelevant ruler.
Educational policy prior to and during the Franco regime was inextricably intertwined
with the Spanish Catholic church. In other words, the lack of historical memory construction
cannot be understood without discussion of the Church. The Church had long been charged with
administering educational policy by the state, aside from brief periods of secular exception. By
the 1960s and 70s, however, the Franco regime and the Church had begun to see their long
relationship in education fracture. This shift was evident in the rapid decrease of Catholic
imagery in textbooks, signifying the Church’s waning influence in Ministry of Education
3

policy.11 In the context of Spain’s long history of Catholic-controlled education, this shift was
unprecedented.
This rupture was contemporaneous with a more general divorce between the Spanish
Catholic Church and the Franco regime. Some historians explain this shift through external
factors such as Franco’s place in the Cold War as an ally with the West and reforms within the
Vatican. However, other historians correctly turn to internal factors to explain the schism in
Franco’s dictatorship. Chief among these factors is the concept of historical memory. Tying up
the two parts of my argument, the split between the Franco Regime and the Catholic Church in
the realm of educational policy is explained by the lack of historical memory surrounding the
Spanish Civil War.
My thesis draws on a combination of firsthand accounts and government action to create
a clear timeline of educational policy in the Franco regime. In other words, I undertake an
examination of both oral history testimony and statutory actions by the Franco regime to support
my claims. Oral history testimony from those who did not remember the Civil War but still lived
under the Franco Regime offers insight into anti-Franco dissent within Spain. This larger
discontent directly correlates with the legal action taken by the Franco regime to change the
education system in attempt to bolster their standing among the Spanish public, to no avail.
My thesis first examines the Church and its domination of education prior to the Second
Republic, which was established in 1931. The Republic set in motion a series of reforms that
sought to secularize the Spanish education system. Republican leaders often showed hostility to
the Church as an institution. This led the Church to support Franco and the Nationalists, who

Angulo and Laina, “Teaching Economics with Spanish Primary School Textbooks during the
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promised them control of educational policy.12 Next, my thesis examines the manner in which
the Nationalists under Franco prosecuted the Spanish Civil War. Examination of the Civil War is
essential for understanding the aforementioned foundational pillar of the regime. Franco’s war of
attrition engulfed Spain in a perpetual state of terror and set the stage for his rule.
After the end of the Civil War, educational policy developed in three phases. The first ran
from 1938 to 1951, which began with the implementation of the law of 1938, where education
was impractical and geared toward economic elites with the goal of solidifying Franco’s
national-Catholic dictatorship in the aftermath of the White Terror, which saw Nationalists
extrajudicially murder over 130,000 known and suspected detractors.13 This period of terror left
many Spaniards in a state of political silence for a generation. While Franco’s forces were
cleansing virtually all opposition in the country, the stand-in government appointed reactionary
Catholic José Ibáñez Martín to lead the Ministry of Education.14 Ibáñez Martín then led the push
for national-Catholic education with the goal of indoctrinating Spain’s youth in order to ensure
Franco stayed in power. However, the regime did not prioritize creating a common historical
narrative of the Civil War a priority in their educational policies.15 In order to display the
regime’s indoctrination through education strategy, I examine a textbook issued by the Ministry
of Education under Ibáñez Martín. These textbooks disclose the goal of the Franco Regime’s
policy of indoctrination and provide a clear overview of the relationship between Church and
state in education in the beginning of the Franco regime.
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Phase two, 1952-1962, saw the end of Ibáñez Martín’s tenure as Minister of Education
and the passing of the 1953 Law of Secondary Education, which attempted to fix the holes in its
1938 predecessor. Spanish education policy was widely criticized for being impractically geared
towards economic and social elites with its humanistic curriculum. Franco attempted to address
these critiques by signing the Law of Secondary Education in 1953, which made modest
reforms.16 However, the law did not secularize education, Catholics retained their place as
leaders in education. This phase also began to see renewed dissent against the government, as
students began to organize against restrictions on academic freedom. The 1950s marks the
beginning of unrest in the educational policy realm, which I will explore through analysis of
policy changes alongside oral history testimonials from Spaniards who actively dissented from
Franco at the time.
The last phase, 1963-1975, began when the first examples of secular textbooks started to
appear in secondary schools. This followed a series of reformist Education Ministers, coupled
with reforms from the Vatican, alongside disagreements between the Papacy and Franco
himself.17 Young Spaniards’ lack of memory of Franco’s terror drove them to question and
openly dissent from the Regime, contributing to the government’s break with the Church
concerning educational policy, as the Regime felt the education system existed mostly to
legitimize its rule, which it was failing to do. This is also seen in young clergy members, who
often saw Spain’s extensive poverty as the result of Franco’s policies and subsequently sought
reform unlike any generation before.18 In addition, the Church’s generational divide was in part
due to the fact that there was no active threat of anti-clerical violence as there was during the

Clark, “The Reform of Secondary Education in Spain,” 27.
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Civil War, which rocked the foundational element of their relationship with Franco. This was
coupled with Vatican reforms that angered Franco. The 1960s were also a time of great protest
and discontent. Oral history testimony from dissenters of the time indicate that historical memory
of the Civil War created a rift between themselves and their parents, which led youth to critique
the regime more openly.19
The Centrality of the Church in Education Before Franco
When examining educational policy through church and state relations in Spain prior to
the Second Republic, what is evident is the power possessed by Church as a social and political
institution. This is reflected its close relationship to the monarchy and other rulers in Spanish
history, such as General Miguel Primo de Rivera. This relationship led to policy outcomes like
the Spanish Inquisition. However, what should be deduced from the time before the Second
Republic is the significance of Catholic controlled education, as it was more or less a norm, with
a few exceptions. When there were exceptions, the Church sought to regain its status as an
educational hegemony, as they valued this monopoly.
Prior to 1931, the Church enjoyed supremacy in most aspects of public life through its
close relationship to the state. Hostility towards other religions was historically commonplace in
Spain. In 1478, the papal bull Exigit sinceras devotionis affectus which was in response to
requests from Catholic monarchs, which authorized them to appoint inquisitors on the papal
state’s behalf to investigate heresy.20 King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella of Spain were Catholic
monarchs who, in 1481, empowered these inquisitors in their mission to promote pure
Catholicism. First, Muslims, called Moors by Spanish Catholics, were expelled from the Spanish

19
20

Boix, “Testimony of the Spanish Civil War and the Francoist Dictatorship.”
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city of Granada in the decade that followed the appointment of the inquisitors. This process often
involved violence. In 1492, Isabella and Ferdinand issued the Edict of Expulsion, which expelled
Jewish Spaniards from the country, against often resulting in violence, removal of families, and
this time forced conversion.21 This would become known as the Spanish Inquisition. Moors
would not escape persecution. In 1609, the Spanish crown issued a decree expelling all Muslims
from the province of Valencia, resettling them in North Africa.22 Valencia was only the first
domino to fall, as expulsion in Aragon and Catalonia took place in the next year, followed by the
rest of Spain in less than a decade.23
Catholicism was declared the national religion of Spain, first in the Constitution of 1812.
This principle was explicitly reiterated in the constitutions of 1845 and 1876.24 Additionally, the
constitution of 1876 saw the restoration of the Catholic monarchy, and was not officially
replaced until 1931.25 As for education, Spain saw a short liberalization during and shortly after
the First Carlist War (1833-1839), which broke out due to the controversial succession of
Isabella II.26 As Isabella II was an infant, María Cristina, the last wife of Fernando VII, was
elevated to regent, and appointed a moderate-liberal government to serve in Isabella II’s name.27
This kicked off a period of secularization, with the state taking control of universities. The new
government also gained oversight powers over secondary and primary education.28 In the 1840s,
universities began offering doctoral degrees, and education displayed equalities of curriculum

Jacob Rader Marcus and Marc Saperstein, “The Spanish Inquisition Begins Operations,” 199.
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regarding gender: both boys and girls in primary schools were taught grammar, mathematics,
reading, writing, and sacred history. The exception being in rural communities, where girls were
taught domestic skills and boys were taught agricultural techniques.29 This period of
securitization was derailed by the signing of the Concordat of 1851 by Pope Pius IX, in
agreement with Isabella II, that stated:
[Article 2. As a consequence, the instruction in the Universities, high schools,
seminaries and public or private schools of whatever type, will be in total conformity to
the doctrine of the same Catholic religion; and to this end there will be no impediment put
on any of the bishops and the other diocesan prelates, charged by his ministry to watch
over the purity of the doctrine of the faith and of the customs, and over the religious
education of the youth, in the exercise of this command, even in public schools.]30

Although this strongly worded Concordat was issued, the Church did not fully regain
power over education until the constitution of 1876, which followed the Third Carlist War and a
military coup which installed the Bourbons back onto the Spanish throne.31
Spain, a declining world power for much of the 19th century, officially ceded its status as
a world power in 1898 due to their defeat in the Spanish-American War. This period, a turning
point for the country, saw an educational system that was inadequate and irrelevant in the lives
of most children in the agrarian economy.32 During this time, the Church would find themselves
expanding their control of education, as the state had not repossessed previous educational
infrastructure, because, as previously mentioned, education was not considered a priority. In the

29
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20th century, the vast majority of Spanish towns educated their children through a private
Catholic secondary school.33
As the 20th century progressed, it became apparent that education needed to become more
of a priority as Spain’s economy shifted towards industrialization.34 Children increasingly
needed more skills and educational opportunities that were not abundant in schooling
administered by the Church. In reality, the Church was not up to the task, as mainly reflected in
Spain’s dismal literacy rates. In each Spanish province capital, illiteracy ranged between 30%
and 70% in the first two decades of the 20th century, with more women illiterate than men.35
Between 1923 and 1930, the Church was propped up by the dictator Primo de Rivera.36
The Second Republic and Political Violence Ignite the National-Catholic Alliance and
Prelude Terror 1931-1936
The alliance between the Spanish Catholic Church and the Nationalists was
commonsensical for the Church, in part because of the loss of influence it experienced following
the creation of the Second Republic in 1931. With the ushering a new government, there came
the prospect of abolition of the close ties between church and state, which came to fruition with
the departure of King Alfonso XIII. The King’s exit filled many Catholics with fear, since it
erased the official tie, the Church had with the State. To make matters worse, the new Republic
declared that there was no official religion of Spain.37 Catholic control of education was also
threatened. The constitution dissolved the Society of Jesus, the Jesuits, and forbade religious

33

Graham and Labanyi, Spanish Cultural Studies, 44.
Domke, “Education, Fascism, and the Catholic Church in Franco’s Spain,” 30.
35
Id., 31.
36
Id., 34.
37
Graham and Labanyi, Spanish Cultural Studies, 139.
34

10

orders from teaching.38 The most aggressive secularization policy passed in the Second Republic
came in 1933, with the Law of June 6, 1933, which officially declared that the state had control
over education policy and cut the Church out of the process entirely.39 New Republican
education initiatives also focused on equality of opportunity. These programs saw a modest
increase in women in higher education, women’s literacy rates also increased. This was
juxtaposed to traditional forms of Catholic educational philosophy, which was male centric, with
little to no attention paid to women and girls in Spain. In many cases, they worked to undermine
and denigrate education for women.40 Educational control had been a pillar of Catholic social
dominance prior to the Second Republic. Thus, it was a focal point of Republicans who were
looking to create a secular, government. This resulted in a loss of influence for the Church and
created a firm hostility between the Catholic hierarchy and the new government.
The Spanish Civil War began in 1936. Its ideological nature split Spaniards into factional
lines that even pitted families against each other. The extreme factional nature of the war left
Spain scarred for a century, as a tide of violence swept through the country. Many prominent
Catholics in Spain viewed the Civil War as a war of survival in addition to a war for greater
influence. Nationalists, who were split into multiple factions, held the Church in high regard.
They were often galvanized by anti-clerical violence displayed by Republican supporters, in
addition to loss of Church influence in the governments ran by left-wing politicians. These issues
untied the Nationalists and the Church in the fight for Spain during the Civil War, creating a
mutual beneficial partnership that lasted throughout Franco regime.

38
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In order for Republican sympathizers to succeed, they needed to form a big-tent coalition
across the left of the political spectrum, which resulted in the Popular Front. The Popular Front
included moderate professional class Republicans, an exceedingly small number of whom were
Catholics, socialists, communists, and anarchists. The more extreme end of this political
coalition showed an open hostility to Catholics, which culminated in destruction of property and
violence directed at clergy members.41 Stanley G. Payne argues that Falangist and rightist parties
in Spain saw an uptick in activity motivated in opposition to anti-clerical violence. In addition to
being an antagonizing issue for the right, also served as a powerful tool of persuasion for
Nationalists, as Payne also writes that these acts of violence often pushed moderate Spaniards
away from the Republicans and towards the nationalists because more center-right and less
radical Spaniards were often motivated in opposition to this violence rather than other issues.42
Moderates saw the Republic as a failure because they failed to protect clergy and Church
property from radical destruction. In addition to violence as a motivating factor, religious
Spaniards were fearful of Communism, which they thought would bring about further
persecution.43 Finally, Catholics felt as though the Republic was a weak governing body.
Catholic Spaniards and the Church alike saw the Republic as opposed to their core values, and
although there is evidence to suggest rank in file Spanish Catholics were wary of militaristic
Nationalists, they sided with them because of the perceived threats posed by the Republic.44
Franco was on the Republic’s list of potential leaders for a coup. Because of this,
Republican officials kept a close eye on the general while conducting risk mitigation with
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military leadership. In the early days of the Republic, Franco himself initially did not question
the legitimacy of the new government. It was only when Manuel Azaña, the provisional minister
of war, closed the General Military Academy in 1931 that Franco spoke out, albeit using light
rhetoric. He proclaimed “viva España” rather than “viva República,” when addressing his cadets
for the last time, hardly the most earth shattering statement.45 Azaña reprimanded Franco for this
by briefly stripping him of his post and placed him under surveillance.46. His decision to stay out
of political activism was grounded in pure self-interest, as evidenced by his lack of participation
in Jose Sanjurjo’s coup attempt in 1932, as Franco undoubtedly aligned with Sanjurjo politically,
but chose not to participate because he felt it would be.47 Simply put: Franco bided his time.
Although politically dormant for the time being, Franco showed his potential for brutality
in 1934. In that year, workers in the mining district of Asturias were convinced Fascism was
about to engulf Spain in the wake of building political tension. What concerned them in
particular was the relationship between Catholicism and Fascist political parties such as the
Falange.48 The widely accepted reason for the strike was the rise of the Catholic Authoritarian
party, the Confederación Espanola de Derechas Autonomas, or CEDA, who was given a seat at
the table in collation negotiations in 1933.49 Because of this, miners began to strike, as they saw
the rise of a radical non-secular party as a prelude to fascism. They looked to gain control of
local garrisons, overthrow government officials, and while doing so killing over 100 civilians in
the process.50 This led radical Minister of War, Diego Hidalgo to unofficially task Franco with
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the suppression of the rebellion.51 Franco appointed an underling, Juan Yague, to take control of
Africanista troops sent to the coast of Asturias.52 This marks the first time in the Republic that
the government sent Africanista troops to quell a political uprising. Troops would take prisoners
and civilians alike and use them as human shields as they advanced into villages. People in
villages were shot at random to dissuade them from aiding the rebels. Women were raped, men
taken into custody were tortured and subsequently shot in the yards of hospitals.53 In total, Paul
Preston summarizes that the most accurate figure pertaining to total deaths in relation to the
uprising is 111 total deaths, with 182 documented injuries.54
The politics of Asturias were clear. The new right wing coalition would send Africanista
troops to violently crush a strike organized by working class Spaniards, and no repression would
be too brutal as long as their desired outcomes were achieved.55 This fueled a left wing
propoganda campaign depicting this notion along with the brutality of the forces deployed by a
right wining government.56 Although some question the historical narrative surrounding the
repression by calling into question the role of propoganda in the telling of Asturias story,57 is that

Preston, “General Franco as Military Leader,” 25.
Payne and Palacios, Franco, 90.
53
Preston, The Spanish Holocaust, 90.
54
Ipid., 90.
55
Kerry, “Fascism and the Politics of Policing (1933–4).” 99.
56
Id., 99.
57
The debate among historians regarding the Austrias Rebellion revolves around the violence on
both sides of the conflict. One group of historians emphasize the role of propaganda in the
crafting of historical narrative around Austrias, as left-wing propaganda forces before and during
the Civil War alike would depict the uprising as a massive show of brutality and repression on
behalf of a right wing government. One example of is historian Stanley G. Payne, who, in his
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it marks a shockingly accurate foresight of Spanish Fascism and Franco’s repressive
government. Franco felt no issue using violence against the Spanish population because he
viewed his own people as enemies rather than fellow citizens. This provides unique insight into
his mindset during the brutality he would unleash in the upcoming war, as he clearly felt no
compassion nor empathy towards Spaniards whom he considered enemies.
During the prelude to war, Franco was still reluctant to join the Nationalists prior to the
actual coup. As a result of this, Franco was not considered the shoe-in leader of any right-wing
coup despite being the most visible leader in the Spanish Army as Chief of Staff.58 The first
discernable leader of the eventual coup would be General Jose Sanjurjo, who made clear his
considerable distain of Franco, stemming from Franco’s indecisiveness.59 Alongside widely
respected General Emilio Mola, he and Sanjurjo60 were thought to be an unstoppable team, as
Mola made up for Sanjurjo’s lack of political talent, whereas Sanjurjo was considered one of the
brightest military minds in Spain.61 Franco’s indecisiveness could have cost him prominence in
the prospective rebellion, but Mola recognized the importance of Franco to it, as Franco still held
command over Spain’s African troops. Mola came to terms with the reality that Spain’s standing
army alone could not carry out the coup. He convinced a skeptical Sanjurjo that they needed
Franco, and thus, kept him in the loop.62 Franco would recognize that Spain was on an
undeniable trajectory to civil war, and he further recognized that his side needed to win. During
the initial stages of the coup, Franco was in the Canary Islands serving as military commander.
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Franco considered this assignment, given to him by the Republic, a destierro, or a banishment.63
This left him many miles away from his army in Spanish Morocco, unable to take control of the
coup as it happened.64
Although Franco was not initially positioned to lead the rebellion, his fortune would turn
quickly, albeit in an unexpected turn of events. Jose Sanjurjo was killed in a plane crash on his
way to Morocco via Portugal.65 Ironically, it is now widely accepted that Sanjurjo, despite his
prestige, would not have been able to lead the Nationalists to certain victory, given his obstinacy
and decrepit aging state. This opened the door for Franco, who flew to Morocco in Sanjurjo’s
stead. This led him to become the de facto leader of the insurgency, as even Mola had to cede to
Franco. General Franco held the necessary visibility and prestige. He possessed superior tactical
ability, and he controlled the Moroccan army, the most powerful force in the Spanish army.
What is clear in the study of the many complexities of the period prior to the Civil War is
that the Catholic Church in Spain were natural allies with the Nationalists, given their support for
traditional values and their support of Catholic centric education. This was coupled with anticlerical atrocities committed by left wing agitators. This violence convinced skeptical Spanish
Catholics who were wary of the Nationalists to off them their support, as violence proved to be a
motivating factor. On top of the escalating culture of political violence in Spain, Franco, who
exhibited violent and repressive tendencies when handling the rebellion in Asturias, broke his
political inaction with the death of Jose Sanjurjo, setting up the violent civil war and the massive
repression that would follow.
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The Spanish Civil War and the White Terror 1936-1939
Franco’s legitimacy was based primarily on the repression, as it instilled immense fear in
the Spanish public following the Civil War. From the beginning, violence was common in both
Republican and Nationalist controlled territories. Political violence had been commonplace
amongst the more radical groups in the Republican Coalition, and this did not change during the
war. However, this is not to dilute the fact that Nationalist violence, even at the beginning of the
war, was at a much greater scale and much more organized.66 This would leave many passive
Spaniards fortunate enough to survive traumatized and silent for generations to come, as Franco
had established himself as a brutal tyrant in the eyes of those who were lucky enough to survive
the war. The war also solidified the marriage between the Church and Franco, as the anti-clerical
violence feared by both came to fruition in the war. These atrocities pushed the two closer
together, which set up the long standing relationship, which this thesis looks to examine.
Although the Republicans are famous for their notorious infighting during the Civil War,
anti-clerical violence untied them like few other issues did. The most fringe groups, anarchists,
and communists67 were in total agreement that the Spanish Catholic Church, as an institution,
was an enemy of their goals.68 Although there were underlying reasons for animosity towards the
church,69 the principal reason for this antagonism was the Church’s connection to the right
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wining movements, as seen prior in the discussion of the Asturias rebellion. This held true
throughout more than just socialist movements involved in that rebellion.70
Violence against Catholic institutions entailed many deaths. According to the historian
Julio de la Cueva:
6,832 members of the Catholic clergy were massacred, including 13 bishops, 4,172
diocesan priests and seminarists, 2,364 monks and friars and 283 nuns. Statistics are even
more distressing for individual dioceses - for instance, in Barbastro 88 per cent of the
secular clergy were slaughtered, 66 per cent in Lerida, 62 per cent in Tortosa, 44 per cent
in Segorbe, about half of the priests in Malaga, Minorca and Toledo, 40 per cent in Ciudad
Real and Ibiza. 71

These estimates are astonishing and illustrate the larger fear in among Spanish Catholics that a
Republican victory would unleash hostilities to an even greater scale. It also speaks to the
universal animosity towards the Church shared by Republican factions, as across all provinces
and most major Spanish cities controlled by Republicans speaks to the power of the violent
rhetoric against the Church. Regardless of their deeply factional nature, some parts of the
Republican alliance acted upon this rhetoric on a large scale. Violence was condoned by official
Republican leadership.72 However, in the case that local leaders endorsed violence a committee
was formed to handle coordinated anti-clerical activities. In the towns of Granollers and Sitges,
trucks full of troops originating from large Republican cities such as Barcelona would come
pouring in. They would then enter churches and monasteries, placing its occupants under arrest.
More often than not, churches would be burned. If they were left standing, they were used as
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prisons, garages, or storage.73 Violence such as this, regardless of how rare, fueled Nationalist
propoganda, as burning churches made for good film reels to galvanize the public to support the
Nationalists.
The international Catholic reaction to the Civil War demonstrates the effectiveness of
both propaganda and the desires of Church officials for Spain to remain Communist free. This is
evidenced by Peter Amigo of England, a pro-Franco Catholic, felt their fears were proven
correct, given the materialization of clerical violence. International catholic opinion, of course,
was not uniform, but fear of Republicans who committed violence against Catholics was
motivating, just as it was in Spain, as he said in 1936: "If they are rebels, then, thank God, I am
one… The people in Spain who were attacking the Government were not rebels, they are fighting
for the Church of God."74 Amigo’s statements indicate that he might have been looking to justify
support for Franco’s forces apart from anti-clerical violence by imposing the threat of
communism, which Catholics viewed in a fearful light. English Catholic newspapers, during the
first months of the war, would use headlines such as "Barcelona under Red Terror," "Many
Priests Shot: Every Church in City Burned," and "Bodies of Nuns Dug up and Destroyed.”75 The
blending of violence and fear of Marxism rallied skeptical Catholics in Europe to Franco’s cause.
This international notion is further exemplified by a case study of Boston Catholics. Similar to
England, Boston’s Catholic hierarchy was in favor of Franco, as exemplified by Cardinal
William O’Connell, who would try to quell the concerns his congregation had about Franco
reaching out to fascists like Adolf Hitler for help by stating: “why shouldn’t he reach out to them
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for help,” and claimed Franco was simply defending Christian civilization. 76 All Factors
considered: the actualization of anti-clerical violence feared by Catholics, and staunch support
from institutions both domestically and abroad, the Spanish Church and Franco’s Nationalists
were inextricably intertwined. Their good fortune saw their rise to power, which benefitted both
sides for a majority of the Franco Regime’s rule.
As this thesis moves through the 20th century, it is important to keep in mind the
atrocities committed against the clergy on behalf of some on the Republican side. The Spanish
clergy would keep these memories in the forefront of their minds throughout their relationship
with Franco. Preventing such violence from reoccurring were a motivational factor in keeping a
close relationship with the Regime. Even though Franco was repressive, the Church would
simply overlook this as the years went on given what they thought was at stake.
Nationalist repression started immediately. Franco initially did not take direct control.
This much, is agreed upon by historians. However, there is debate as to exactly how much
control Franco had over the early repression. According to historian Stanley Payne Franco, while
complicit, was more or less taking part in an inevitable repression and military terror that would
have been drawn out in similar fashion had he not been there to take the reins. What must be
avoided when interpreting Payne’s argument is reaching the conclusion that he does not take
Franco’s repression seriously or absolve him of blame, Payne says that he actively took part in
military terror but was not a unique architect. Furthermore, Payne shows that Franco, regardless
of his feelings or role in the terror, sought to benefit from the fear it created within the Spanish
public, this being the most important insight drawn from Stanley Payne’s arguments.
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On the other hand, another prominent historian of the Civil War and the Franco Regime,
Paul Preston, takes a different approach.77 Preston argues that total annihilation was not only way
of winning the war, therefore, obliteration was not a total inevitability. Given that Franco felt a
swifter end to the war, which was logistically achievable, would leave a substantial number of
detractors alive. Furthermore, living combatants would require concessions to cease their
resistance, Preston summarizes, therefore Franco saw extermination as the only way to cleanse
Spain of left wining adversaries. The distinction from Payne’s argument is the aggression shown
by Franco was less the result of a well-oiled inevitable terror machine. Rather, it was more of a
mechanism to cleanse Spain of ideological opponents.
While the two historians agree that Franco was brutal, and that a large part of his early
legitimacy was based upon the terror he created, I find Preston more convincing. Although many
right-wing generals would undoubtably have committed to the same strategy of terror78, the fact
that Franco himself outlined a less efficient strategy from a military perspective in order to
subjugate, repress, and strike terror into Spaniards, to me, proves that Franco was uniquely
responsible for the war of annihilation that was the Spanish Civil War.
This is further proven when noted that Franco’s forces outmatched their adversaries
handily, which reflects their strategy of total annihilation of both the Republican ideology and
their believers. Nationalists held absolute advantages in military experience, arms, and overall
unity. In order to properly understand the fear that controlled Spaniards who live through the
war, it is imperative to understand that the Nationalist campaign of ideological cleansing did not
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come out of necessity. Rather, it took place as a deliberate strategy to ensure that Spain would
never fall under democratic rule after the war which. The Nationalist perpetrators placed this
goal above simply winning the war outright in order to give Franco a clean slate on which to
govern with.
The largest point of advantage enjoyed by the Nationalists was that of substantive
military experience. Republican forces constituted of mostly previously untrained volunteers
who were ideologically opposed to what they understood as fascists descending upon their
government.79 When the insurgency broke, a clear majority of army officers took part in it, ,
leaving most experienced officers unavailable for the government to use in the war.80
Furthermore, the officers who did not partake in the insurgency were not trusted by the
government, leading them to be purged or never given vital commands.81 Given the political
nature of the, the vacuum created by the lack of officers were often filled by influential political
leaders, who were perhaps well versed in political issue or philosophy but lacked even the most
basic knowledge required to be an adequate line officer in an army. 82 This lack of military
experience led Republicans to make poor strategic decisions throughout the war.
Republican forces were also incredibly outgunned for the entirety of the conflict. At first,
a substantial amount of weapons, ammunition, and artillery were Republican controlled in 1936,
despite the insurgency in garrison towns.83 Issues began to arise for the Republic as these arms
depleted because sympathetic democracies would often claim neutrality and sent no arms to their
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cause.84 Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, however, supplied Franco’s forces with $505 million
worth of war materials, 150,000 troops, and 10,000 technicians.85 The only Republican ally to
contribute was the Soviet Union, who was more inclined to do so because of their ideology and
increasing conflict with fascism. Their aide to the Republicans paled in comparison to their
adversaries, however, as it consisted of $100 million in supplies and $2,000 additional
technicians.86 Most of the Republic’s outside fighting force consisted of 50,000 international
volunteers, 40,000 of whom fought in the famed international brigades, dubbed “los
internacionales” by their Spanish allies.87
One of these international volunteers was famed author George Orwell, who wrote a
memoir of his time in Spain entitled Homage to Catalonia, in which he documented yet another
fatal flaw in the Republican forces: division. Orwell remembers in his memoir:
“For some time past there had been tension in Catalonia…By May 1937 things had
reached a point at which some kind of violent outbreak could be regarded as inevitable…
there was an irreconcilable difference between Communists and Anarchists... Since the
beginning of the war, the Spanish Communist Party had grown enormously in
numbers…there had come into Spain thousands of foreign Communists, many of whom
were openly expressing their intention of ‘liquidating’ Anarchism as soon as the war
against Franco was won.”88
As Orwell stated, the situation in strongholds such as Catalonia was extremely tense within the
Republican ranks, as clearly one ally who looks to eradicate another after a conflict in which
they share a desired goal is not optimal for unity. Orwell left Catalonia a wanted man, as the
Communist party began to cannibalize its once loyal followers by hunting down “Trotskyist
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rebels.”89 Orwell’s story is common and proves the fractious fragile nature of the Popular Front
alliance in the war, further illustrating the weakness of the Republic as both a political and
military force.
As seen above, it is clear that the Nationalists clearly possessed substantive absolute
advantages over the Republicans. This not only makes it difficult to imagine a scenario in which
the Popular Front achieved victory, but also calls into question the military necessity of their
oppressive campaign. The evidence shows that Franco’s forces needed not to be bogged down in
military conflict, they wished to cleanse the country of opposing ideologies despite their weak
military standing, which suggests that the Nationalist’s strategy was executed out of political
necessity The significance of this uneven war of obliteration further displays the new foundation
in which Franco looked to build as he drew closer to his goal.
As Franco’s forces advanced towards final Republican strongholds, they showed no
remorse in their aggressive repression of the population along the way. Republican prisoners
were shot on sight, in many cases as soon as they were captured. The brutality was not reserved
for the army, as civilians were often shot on sight for an offense as minuscule as speaking
Catalan. Rape was extremely common. As soldiers made their way through towns, they would
commit unspeakable sexually charged atrocities. In one case, a woman was raped while her son
and husband were forced, at gun point, to watch. Another was stabbed in the stomach after the
fact with a bayonet, while two other women were killed after regulares placed grenades between
their legs after raping them.90
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The scene in Barcelona as the Nationalists entered was grizzly. Survivor accounts detail
wounded soldiers walking around without limbs, dead combatants and civilians alike laying in
the streets, and thousands of petrified refugees fleeing to the French boarder.91 It was now that
Franco began to lay out his vision for the defeated Republicans. He viewed his enemies in two
ways: those who were irredeemable criminals who betrayed the national spirit of Spain itself and
those who had been deceived by their superiors. For the deceived, years in a labor camp would
suffice as they could be redeemed. For the criminals, exile was their best hope, as only then
could they escape death.92 Countless arrests were made as the Francoists established control over
Catalonia, with brief public military trails were held followed by swift public executions. 22,700
people were arrested in only the first eight months of Franco’s rule, with more than 1,700
executions in Barcelona, 750 in Lleida, 703 in Tarragona and five hundred in Girona, with many
more dying from harsh prison conditions.93
In 1939, Madrid was falling after a two-and-a-half-year long siege. For the socialist
Prime Minister Juan Negrín and a majority of his cabinet, they could not avoid their fate. The
only option was to fight to the bitter end in order to stave off annihilation. Non-communist
Republicans opposed this measure, as they were able to see the direness of their situation and
concluded the only rational solution was to sue for some form of peace. In true Republican
fashion, this disagreement turned into violence: as a brief period of fighting broke out in Madrid
between communists and non-communists. As his side was crippled, Negrín would leave the

91

Preston, The Spanish Holocaust, pp. 465.
Id., pp. 464.
93
Id., pp. 467.
92

25

country in exile while Franco’s forces simply walked through a quiet and virtually defenseless
Madrid.94
Franco would not waste time in asserting his authority: first declaring martial law in 1936
that would stand in place until 1948.95 The overall picture of the repression would be painted by
executions and overflowing prisons, as Franco left no room for reconciliation. Repression
resulted in over 50,000 documented executions, with thousands more dying in prison due to
conditions related to overcrowding. For Example: at the end of the war, Madrid had produced
50,000 new prisoners with only 20,000 places open in national prisons, nationally. It is estimated
that over 500,000 Spaniards passed through Franco’s prison camps by the time they were
dismantled.96
The Spanish Civil War and the repression that followed struck fear into the hearts of the
Spanish people who managed to live through it for decades. In many cases, they never were able
to escape the terror, as it engulfed them for the rest of their lives. This holds consistent with
accounts of eventual dissenters of the later Franco regime is that their relatives who remained
“apolitical” and were wary of disobeying Franco.
Take Carmen Borrell Pérez for example. She was born in 1921 and joined the youth
socialist movement in the early days of the Republic. Borrell Pérez was imprisoned for her
militancy by the Franco regime in the Civil War. She recalls arriving in Las Ventas women’s
prison, where she remained for over a year, to Falangist wardens and guards beating the
prisoners as they walked by. The violence described by Borrell Pérez was abhorrent: a woman
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who brought her young child with her had them stripped from her hands and witnessed guards
beat the child to death, an older woman who was beaten mercilessly by wardens until her body
was severely bruised. Inmates were also tortured as they were interrogated, and Borrell Pérez
remembers being terrified as the loudspeaker announced names that were summarily executed
nightly.97
Regardless of Republican anti-clerical violence and general atrocities, Nationalist terror
left the biggest mark on Spain for the decades following the war. At least 130,000 extrajudicial
deaths engulfed the Nationalist zone. This number far outweighs those killed in the Republican
zone, even when considering the inflated conclusion reached by the Franco Regime. Shortly after
the war, Franco would often claim hundreds of thousands of deaths in Republican held territory,
once claiming 470,000 people were killed behind their lines. He must have been disappointed
when his government estimated 85,940 killings occurred, a number which was inflated but which
was far less than Franco’s exaggerations.98
The Civil War and the terror are essential to understanding the larger marriage between
the Catholic Church and Franco’s Regime in the larger realm of education. First, the Church was
willing to become a close partner to the Regime because of the danger that was posed by the
fringe elements of the Republican alliance. Although anti-clerical violence never rose to the level
that was even comparable to the Terror, it was significant, as has been shown. The Church
believed the only way to ensure their survival was to link themselves to the regime, despite
Franco’s blatant fascistic tendencies. As will be shown in the following sections, members of the
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clergy would often fall back on this relationship because of the violence both during and
following the Civil War.
Franco’s war of annihilation was not fought out of necessity, as the Nationalist coalition
possessed an absolute advantage over their opponents. The terror inflicted upon the Spanish
people was done so in order to provide Franco’s new dictatorial regime with a clean slate on
which to govern. Dissent would be subdued by mass fear and repression, which many Spaniards
felt directly. What followed was a political culture of painful silence resulting from fear of
violent reprisal for any dissent. Franco accomplished what he set out to achieve with the terror.
The newly ascendant dictator turned his focus to education with the goal of turning his
legitimacy through fear into a sustainable regime.
Phase One: The Church Retakes Control of Education Under Franco, 1939-1951
After the war, Franco needed to build a sustainable regime, and he looked directly to
education to accomplish this goal. Now having forged a strong relationship with the Catholic
Church, Franco would allow them to assume control of education, as they had traditionally. In a
partnership with the Church, Franco required loyalty in order to execute his strategy of
indoctrination. It was not enough for people to fear Franco, he needed them to respect and revere
him in order to construct his regime.
The partnership between the Church and Nationalists extended beyond a defense of the
institution or its property, as the Church aided the Nationalists in their war of attrition and post
war oppression. In some cases, by direct action and others by their purposeful silence. One must
not mistake silence for either passiveness or ignorance on the part of Church leaders, for they
were in constant contact with the preparators of terror. In some cases, there is evidence that they
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held sway over some repression policies. This is reflected in the Basque country where just under
2,000 were killed, as even Franco’s troops were not as brutal relative to provinces like Catalonia
where 47,399 were killed behind enemy lines and nearby Asturias where Nationalists killed
5,952 people. The Basque country is one of the more Catholic provinces in Spain, and it is
hypothesized that the Church had a hand in restricting oppression there because of it.99 After the
war, the aforementioned military tribunals, were open to the public, and frequently attended by
members of the clergy, either because they wished to spectate or, in some cases, testify.100 Even
attendance at these tribunals should be taken as an endorsement of proceedings, as it although it
was unlikely they could have stopped the tribunals, the many clerics present implies endorsement
in the mass repression of Republicans following the war. This shows that this relationship began
as a balanced marriage, as Franco’s forces received an explicit endorsement of their repressive
policies and, in turn, more Catholic regions were not subject to as strong a massacre.
José Ibáñez Martín was Franco’s top choice to lead the Ministry of Education which was
charged to execute his new strategy. Ibáñez Martín was best described as a right-wing Catholic,
with a strong devotion to Franco as a result of his taking to the Church in the Civil War.101 He
took over the ministry from another extremist Catholic, Pedro Sainz Rodriguez, who served in
the temporary government of Nationalist held territories, called the Burgos government, from
January 1938 to April 1939.102 Franco hoped his radical new head of education would bring
about policy that would indoctrinate a new generation of Spaniards in the mold of Nationalism.
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Although Franco undoubtedly looked to involve the Church not only in education, but
also in his government, there was some question as to how much influence Franco would give
the church. The Church had not only been a prominent institution under Spain’s monarchs, but
they had also exuded a great deal of influence over them, as seen in the aforementioned affairs of
the 19th century. Franco, however, was not as relenting, and clearly wanted power for himself.
Thus, it was he correct position at the time to question what the role of the Church would play in
Franco’s new regime. A natural conclusion to reach, is that a dictator feels they should be the
center of everything in their new government: that the ultimate authority to make all decisions,
both consequential and trivial, lies with them alone. They are the leader in a nation where their
subordinates are to not question their reasoning or their conclusions. Such a powerful institution,
such as the Church, and a figure such as God, could obviously challenge the idea of Franco’s
supremacy. Thus, it is reasonable to imagine a Spain in which the Church was not in charge of
any consequential policy area and held little influence.
This would not be the case, as Franco himself portrayed himself a deeply religious man,
although those close to him would call him a worshipper of patriotism first. The mold for which
he envisioned Spain to become was called national-Catholicism. National-Catholicism promoted
four key concepts: (1) a cult of personality around Franco, (2) the importance of a strong
militaristic Spain, (3) a strong nostalgia around Spain’s former greatness as a colonial world
power as to promote unity, and (4) traditional Catholic values such as order and family.103 This
was Franco’s vision for Spain. Such a vision could not be fulfilled without the Church. Because
of Franco’s attempt to bring Spain together under his national-Catholic banner, the Church
would have a significant role in the execution of his education polices. This is also seen though
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Franco’s appointments to education posts, as they were all themselves extreme Catholics. Albeit
they would never reach the same level of influence they enjoyed under Spain’s monarchy.
Origins of Franco’s education system trace back to the aforementioned provisional
Burgos government, when the law of September 1938 was passed. It created the baccalaureate,
which was based on these National-Catholic principles. Additionally, it was founded on classical
humanities with an extremely ideologized tinge.104 Because of this, it would inevitably create
enormous inequities within the education system, given its humanistic nature, which would favor
upper class children.
The new education system very much reflects this notion of National-Catholicism and
although nearly all Spanish children in the 1940s were educated in Catholic schools, the
government would retain control of educational policies through the Ministry of Education, as
the Republican Ministry of Public instruction was replaced.105 The goal of the education system
in Spain was “re-Spanification” and “re-Catholication.”106 Another reason for the Church’
prevalence in education was to promote their ridged social order, which would help keep the
population away from the former Republican politics, reinforcing Franco’s grip on the
population.107

104

Graham and Labanyi, Spanish Cultural Studies, 199.
Graham and Labanyi, Spanish Cultural Studies, 196.
106
Id. 196.
105

31

Textbooks published in the 1940s display how National Catholicism was taught to
students in the classroom, as seen here in excerpts from a textbook entitled: Asi quiero ser, el
niño del nuevo estado (This is How I Want to Be: The Child of the New State):108

Figure 1

As is apparent from this text, its indoctrination methodology is less than subtle. It reflects the
National-Catholic ethos: Spain being unified as one, under an imperial and Catholic banner. This
is precisely what Franco wished to install in Spain’s youth at the outset of his regime. Further
examination of the textbook also reflects Franco’s priorities in action:109

Figure 2

Franco, as stated prior, intended education as a means of self-promotion, which is reflected here.
Children are urged to obey without arguing, their superiors. The textbook even goes as far as to
call the children “the subordinate ones,” which defines their role in Spanish society. The students
are told to obey El Caudillo, one of Franco’s titles, and the textbook equates the willingness to
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obey Franco as necessary to keep Spain happy, tying submitting to Franco’s whims to national
wellbeing. It is undoubtedly jarring to see indoctrination of children executed in such an overt
manner. However, these texts reflect Franco’s desire to promote both himself and his NationalCatholic vision.
Textbooks also featured biblical images, with textbook creators looking to intertwine
Franco’s fascism with Catholicism. In a particular textbook, España Nuestra, El Libro de las
Juventudes Españolas, (Our Spain, The Book of Spanish Youth), which was central to
curriculum in the 1940s, explicitly equated Jesus Christ’s destiny to that of Spain, and called
upon Spain’s youth to sacrifice, as Jesus did.110 It was not enough to just love Spain, one had to
love Catholicism as they did their country, as the two were spiritually intertwined, as reflected in
the common phrase: “doble amor religioso y Español: ¡Padre nuestro! ¡España nuestra!” (double
love of religion and Spanish: Our Father! Our Spain).111 The authors of these textbooks, mostly
Falangists, or of Falange adjacent ideologies if not a member of the party, very clearly looked to
link the Church with the idea of Nationalism, as Franco’s doctrine dictated.
While Franco’s educational system and its details are important, it cannot be forgotten
where its foundations lay: liquidation of Republicanism. As aspects of the Franco education
system were discussed previously, it was evident that the Ministry of Education looked to
repudiate everything that the various factions of the Republic stood for. Such as individualism,
modernization, equity, secularism, and Democracy.
The extrajudicial killings and terror have been well documented in this paper, in addition,
it is important to acknowledge the purge educators faced following the Civil War. According to
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Domke, over fifty percent of teachers were purged from their positions following the Civil
War.112 This followed the patterns of the Nationalists as they tried to eradicate all Republican
influence from the country. Now that new teachers were appointed, they were undoubtedly
aware of how their predecessors lost their jobs, they were unlikely to question the new
curriculum. Domke again hypothesizes, and correctly so, that new teachers would be hard
pressed to challenge incorrect information provided by the state or other issues with curriculum
for fear of losing their job or worse.
As the early 1950s came around, young people who were educated primarily in this
system entered universities and the workforce, It became evident that they did not take to the
education system as Franco or Ibáñez Martín hoped. This generation did not possess the
firsthand experience of the war the way their parents or older family members did. Most of them
had families who came out on the winning side. However, their frame of reference for Franco’s
dictatorship was repression censorship and general poor living conditions, if not for themselves,
their fellow citizens.113 As they entered universities, some students got involved with a suddenly
resurgent Communist Party, which organized protests in favor of academic freedom.114 As
Communist students clashed with Falangist ones, it reminisced the days prior to the Spanish
Civil War, where paramilitary radicals beat each other bloody along Spain’s streets.
Franco’s education system meant to solidify his desired form of legitimacy; this is
undebatable. The Church, which was given the task of executing this task because of Franco’s
personal ideology, their traditional role in Spanish education, and their extensive partnership
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with the repressive nationalists. Although it is difficult to find an answer to what role Franco
thought the Church should actually play in the government, he was obviously comfortable with
the idea of delegating duties to the Church, since he surrounded himself with education policy
bureaucrats who felt Catholicism should be at the forefront of the new education system along
with Nationalist indoctrination. Thus, the National-Catholic education system was born, which
Franco hoped would build him a network of loyal followers in Spain’s youth. As the events of
the 1950s unfolded, and young people started to question his authority following their
experiences of growing up under Franco’s oppression, it was clear that this system was not
working at present.
Phase Two: Franco’s Education System Falters 1951-1962
As the young people who could no longer vividly remember the Civil War came into
adulthood and as many entered universities, dissent grew. There was not a time they could
remember where Spain was not in abject poverty and unfree, they only remembered the
oppression inflicted upon them by Franco. The regime’s fallback rhetoric which warned the
population of impending communist violence increasingly fell upon deaf ears. It was clear that
the strategy of indoctrination was not producing its desired effect. The 1950s began with a series
of reforms and new personnel within the Ministry of Education, which was a direct result of the
system’s failure to prevent dissent.
Reform started in 1951 with the ousting of Ibáñez Martín. There is no evidence Ibáñez
Martín and Franco had a falling out, the reason Franco gave for the change was a “need for new
blood.”115 Ibanez Martin was Franco’s longest serving minister throughout the entirety of his
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regime, a testament to Franco’s willingness to cycle through ministers. This tendency is
especially relevant in the 1950s, as although he had a stable inner circle throughout the early
1940s, he began to change advisors and ministers at a more rapid rate as his regime went on.
Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez replaced Ibáñez Martín as Minister. Another prominent Catholic,
Ruiz-Giménez was a member of the Asociación Católico Nacional de Propagandists (ACNP),
just as Ibáñez Martín was. From his resume, Ruiz-Giménez seemed like a strict continuation of
former policy. Certainly, another member of the same Catholic extremist group would extend the
Catholic domination of education overseen by the State. However, Ruiz Gimenez would prove to
be a reformer, as he was a strong advocate of reform. While still loyal to Franco, he was
described as open minded, and looked to modernize the education system by incorporating new
aspects of Spanish culture that had previously never been introduced into curriculums.116 He
emphasized the need for curriculum liberalization, choice of study, and expansion of expression,
all of which brought about significant criticisms from the Falangist right. After Franco’s death
and the fall of his regime, Ruiz-Giménez would become a member of the Christian Democratic
Party.117
Major reforms were passed in 1953 under Ruiz-Giménez, first in December, where the
state set targets for new school construction.118 This was set to address the obvious shortfall of
facilities outlined in Ruiz-Giménez original priorities. This was a step towards solving this
problem of inequity but would not fully be addressed until Ruiz Gimenez left office.
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Ruiz-Giménez major piece of reform was passed in February 1953, which was
subsequently named the "Law of 1953.” This law pertained to secondary education and set up
the Bachillerato Universitario, which was meant to act as a pivot towards secondary studies
geared towards economic development. The Bachillerato divided itself into two: elementary
which provided students with basic academic and professional developments, and a higher form
of education which would shift away from classical curriculum towards more practical subjects.
It also encouraged the teaching of general business and economics.119 The law of December
1953 was meant to address Spain’s shortage of skilled laborers, which was especially apparent in
the country’s more rural regions, buy making secondary education more practical.
In 1955, Spain’s lack of skilled workers was still apparent, prompting Franco’s regime to
pass the 1955 Law of Professional Industrial information. This was law accepted Laboral
education, a curriculum based on manufacturing skills and tradesmanship, as an official
discipline, and further supported the previously created Bachillerato Laboral, which was passed
in 1949.120
Although these reforms were attempted, Spain’s educational measures fell far short of
even the European averages. Although literacy rates rose in Spain when compared to the
abysmal rates of the early 20th century, to 44% from 15%, there remained a shocking aspect of
inequality within the system. It is estimated that illiteracy rates in the countryside were at least a
third higher compared to wealthier urban centers. Literacy rates reported by the government were
also based upon faulty principles, as many of Spain’s youth only occasionally went to school or
never at all. According to estimates by Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, only 35% of Spanish children
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regularly attended class in 1950-51, down from 45% in 1940-1941.121 This further illustrates the
inadequacies of Church centered education, even further beyond the failure to indoctrinate
Spain’s youth into the Falangist cult, as they failed to give standard, let alone high quality,
education to the Spanish youth.
Leopoldo Iglesias Macarro was one of those Spaniards who could not afford to spend
much time in schools learning to embrace Franco, as his reality was in a constant state of poverty
in struggle, which prompted him to take up opposition. Iglesias Macarro was nine years old
when the Civil War began. At this early age, he witnessed the murder and mass grave burial of
his uncle, whom he was close to, alongside the imprisonment of family members. After the war,
the surviving members of his family worked in a brewery but were harassed by Falangist
militants because of their family’s active role on the Republican side of the war. Their family
had to move up to the mountains for safety. These events radicalized young Leopoldo, who then
spent his time moving supplies for underground Communist movements and cites the hardships
his family faced as the reason for his actions.122 The situation in the countryside, where Franco’s
education could not reach, galvanized the youth. Even if the regime could reach them, the
adversities they faced could not be superseded by any amount of indoctrination. There is no
doubt that Franco’s repression left its mark on young people like Iglesias Macarro, who would
party find his motivation for being involved with the communist party because of the murder of
his uncle, his political awakening was a result of the hardships and terror Franco imposed on him
personally.
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An additional explanation as to why Franco’s education system was a flop is that relative
to the rest of Europe, Spain had a history of allocating miniscule amounts of its national budgets
to education. Ruiz-Giménez, an aforementioned Franco loyalist, would continually mention in
public engagements that past Spanish liberal governments had not given the funds necessary for
education to thrive in Spain. However, the center-right government of 1935 allocated 1.39% of
its budget to education and in no Franco government but one would reach even 1% of its budget.
In fact, Ruiz-Gimenez oversaw a year in which .64% was allocated, a regime low in 1951.123 In
terms of the rest of Europe, in 1954, Ireland spent 3% of its budget on education, Sweden 2.71%,
Italy 2.68%, and West Germany 2.5% while Spain spent .9%. When compared to actual cash,
Spain’s spending on education was less than half of Argentina’s.124 In contrast, Spain’s defense
spending as out of control. In a time of peace, Spain spent 4.5 times more on defense than
education in 1954.125 Spain’s education problem ran deeper than just the philosophy of
indoctrination and the Catholic administrated curriculum, as the government vastly underfunded
the Education Ministry compared to other countries, choosing to prioritize defense spending,
further exacerbating the problems within the education system.
Protest increased in both intensity and frequency as the 1950s went on, coming to a head
in 1956 in Madrid. The Young Writers University Congress and other groups organized a protest
at Madrid University against censorship in favor of academic freedom. This was different from
other student protests, as it was backed by the Communist Party, which was resurgent among
Spain’s youth. It is possible that the more liberal attitudes of the Ministry of Education under
Ruiz-Giménez encouraged forms of protest such as this. While the protests started, the students
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were met by their peers who supported the Falangists, subsequently clashing in the streets.126
These were the largest and most violent anti-government protests so far in the Franco regime.
The conclusion of these protests left Franco angry, as he thought he won the war against
communism for good. As a result of his rage, he sacked Ruiz-Giménez.
Antonio Martín-Martín was a student in the 1950s who ended up participating in
clandestine meetings. He also provided legal aide to labor unions and underground political
parties. Born just a few years before the Civil War, Martín found himself fortunate to be born
into a right-wing affiliated family, insolating him from repression. In fact, his family was active
in the Falange, as one of Martín’s uncles even participated in the terror following the war. Martín
did not follow in their path; he said he was traumatized from witnessing an execution by firing
squad in his village at an early age. He also witnessed the repression firsthand as his family lived
in a small village in Catalonia. As he grew older, he continued to dissent from Franco,
graduating college in the early 1950s having made it through the Catholic education system
unchanged by its propaganda, as he settled in Barcelona working as a lawyer. He built his career
through providing legal aide to labor unions, political parties, student organizations, and other
clandestine groups. He even attended a few meetings.127 Martín’s story illustrates the alienation
felt by young Spaniards as Franco’s regime went on. It also emphasizes the fact that even though
a great deal of young people who were politically active came from Nationalist-affiliated
families, it did not define them. They were more influenced by the repression and widespread
poverty around them than by their parents. Young people like Martín did not grow up in fear but
were driven to action. This testimony also proves that repression drove this generation towards
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the opposite course of action to that of their parents: active opposition and action against the
regime rather than simple silence
Franco tapped Jesús Rubio García-Mina, a former university professor, to succeed RuizGiménez, and he would serve from his appointment in 1956 to 1962. He would continue the
policy of reform set in motion by his predecessor. This proved to be a pivotal period, as it would
lead to the eventual technocratic model of the 1960s.128 He did manage some reform, as
technical universities were recognized by the ministry in 1959, a move applauded in left wing
spheres such as trade unions. García-Mina would also succeed in securing funding for more
school buildings.129
In the 1950s and into the 1960s, it was evident that Franco’s National-Catholic education
system was failing in achieving their goals. The system lagged behind the rest of Europe terms of
budget allocation and the quality of education was poor. Many of Spain’s youth who did not live
in cities found themselves not attending school regularly, out of financial desperation or a lack of
importance placed on attendance, nevertheless this disparity was a familiar one for Spain and
Franco’s regime had failed to scratch the surface of the issue. Even progress made on literacy
rates posed issues for the regime, as these improved statistics did not consider several significant
caveats pertaining to low attendance rates in rural Spain. The measurables indicate Franco’s
failure to provide for an even competent education for much of Spain’s youth and further calls
into question the effectiveness of his National-Catholic strategy.
In addition to the objective failures to educate Spanish youth, the failure pertaining to the
main aspiration of Franco’s education system: indoctrination. This is evidenced by the growing
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dissent in the 1950s and early 1960s. At Madrid University, for example, was home to a
resurgent underground communist party flexed its influential muscles by backing the largest
antigovernment protests thus far in Franco’s regime. The youth were anything but indoctrinated,
and although their parents were either victorious or fortunate enough to survive the Civil War,
the abject poverty, repression, and censorship they were subjected to growing up were enough
for them to reject the Franco regime outwardly.
The key factor in the difference between the generation of Spanish youth who came of
age in the 1950s and their parents who survived the Civil War is the way they viewed Franco and
his regime through the lens of fear politics. The atrocities of the repression were firmly etched in
the minds of the generation who directly survived it, and it taught them that the best politics were
silent politics. The outspoken among them of their generation were now long dead, some killed
in battle others buried in unmarked graves, shot dead on the side of a road, or put to death by an
ad hoc military tribunal. This was the outcome of passionate political opinions, and thus one
must stay silent to avoid sharing their fate. Their children, on the other hand, did not witness
firsthand the repression. What was fresher in their mind was censorship and widespread poverty,
leading them to further question Franco’s dictatorship.
Phase 3: Franco Divorces Church Education: 1963-1975
As the 1960s continued, it was evident the Catholic administered education was
ineffective and impervious to reform. As dissent and general discontent grew, it was apparent
that a massive change was needed, if Franco was going to realize his dream of a regime that
outlasted him. This led to a complete change in philosophy on part of the Franco regime. A
divorce.
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However, most divorces are mutual, as was the case of the Catholic Church and Franco’s
regime in the realm of education. The fires of a rebellion within the Church against Franco had
been a long time coming. As previously mentioned, the Church saw Franco as an optimal ally in
the Civil War for many reasons, but chief among those was his ability to protect the Church and
its clergy from violent hostilities from groups like anarchists, while also crushing the rising tide
of communism. For older Spanish clergy, the burning churches and clerical killings were fresh in
their minds, while hatred of Republican ideologies still lingered. So did their tendency to stay
silent or ambivalent about the poor economic and social situation in Spain. This is evident when
examining testimonies of Catholic officials in the post-war period, as in 1943, Spain was stricken
with famine, and at a conference organized by the Church in Saragossa on Charity, one priest
referred to his experience with miners in Asturias prior to the war. He painted them as greedy for
wanting better wages and adequate working conditions, as the priest felt there was little to
complain about, The miners became revolutionaries because they “lacked morality” he
claimed.130 Clearly, there was little empathy for the struggles of Spain’s population. It is
strongly implied that calls for higher wages and better working conditions was associated with
being ungrateful. Class prejudice was evident in the 1950s as well, as a Catholic Action book
stated of the lower or working classes: “economic weakness, had a limited culture, a tendency
towards material pleasures and chimerical ideas on social issues.”131
The older priest officials still linked themselves to Franco in public ways, further
illustrating their dwelling on the Civil War. One famous example was Church officials walking
hand in hand with murderous members of the Franco regime, such as General Gonzalo Queipo
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de Llano who had explicitly ordered 8,000 Republicans to be shot, during Spain’s famous Easter
processions in 1968.132 Priests also praised Franco during addresses to their congregations and
provided ample excuses for issues like poverty.
However, in the 1960s, this began to change as younger priests, who were certainly not
sympathetic to Republican ideologies, were more familiar with the widespread hunger and
poverty in Spain, which impacted them more as the Civil War grew ever distant. Youthful
Spanish priests began to move to impoverished communities to better understand the common
Spaniard. They indeed understood their experiences better, as they did not see the working poor
through, he prejudices laced lens of their predecessors. Instead, they began to reconcile with their
class bigotry, as one priest wrote in 1964: “I am not ashamed to say… I was wrong when I
believed that Spanish workers were little more than a bunch of savages, full of vice and hatred,
lazy people who wanted to love without having to work.”133 Although such though is seems
ridiculous, what remains important is the reconciliation amongst the Spanish clergy. During this
time, the anti-Franco minority in the Church began to grow. Some began to openly dissent from
the regime and discuss social issues. Although most officials dismissed this as simple
“constructive criticism,” the fact remains that the Church was diverging from its monolithic ways
of the past.
This new shift in Spanish Catholicism became shattering for their relationship with
Franco when coupled with Vatican reforms of the 1960s. The Second Vatican Council, also
known as Vatican II, met every autumn of the years 1962-1965 for four weeks. Their
conclusions shook the world’s Catholic powers, as Vatican II set new guidelines for Church and
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State relations. The Papacy demanded autonomy from the State’s civic powers, chief among
motivation for doing so being establishing the Vatican’s power to name their own Bishops.134
Vatican II also declared freedom of religion a universal human right, which was juxtaposed to
the National-Catholic Philosophy.135
Needless to say, Franco was infuriated by the decisions reached by Vatican II, especially
as it curtailed his say in naming Spain’s Bishops. In 1967, Spain passed a law of religious
freedom, all but killing Franco’s National-Catholic dream.136 This was a response to the
Vatican’s reforms, as Franco lost his power to name Spain’s bishops. This angered Franco, and
although he still considered himself an ardent believer of National-Catholicism, a combination of
his growing passiveness in old age and his anger towards the Vatican led him to capitulate to his
advisors and allowed them to pass this law. Although the Church never full separated itself from
the Franco regime, it was evident the close partnerships it once enjoyed with the Franco regime
was dead.
The divorce in educational policy happened much sooner than the rest of the relationship,
at the same time, Franco’s Ministry of Education was in chaos. Jesús Rubio García-Mina was
fired in 1962 and was followed by four successive ministers. First was Manuel Lora Tamayo,
who was closely affiliated with the scientists of Franco’s regime and was concerned for the lack
of scientific research being conducted in Spain, hence why he renamed the Education Ministry
the Ministry of Education and Science. He resigned in 1968 as student demonstrations persisted.
He was replaced by the more reformist Jose Luis Villar, who oversaw the passage of the 1970
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General Education Law. Villar was then replaced by Julio Rodríguez who rolled back the law,
and his successor Cruz Martinez Esteruelas also opposed most changes in the law.137
In the 1960s, textbooks changed significantly, starting in 1962. There was new economic
focus, with images of blue-collar laborers taking the place of biblical images such as saints.138
This was an unprecedented shift given the religiously entangled education had been the norm in
Spain for the entirety of the Franco regime. The ethos of Spanish education prior to this:
featuring a heroic Spaniard who loves the Church as they do Spain and who obeys Franco
without question, was replaced by an overarching message of collective labor and emphasis on a
developmentalist economic message. This was done through images of workers in factories
alongside positive economic statistics credited to the regime. Scholars Kira Mahamud Angulo
and Yovana Hernández Laina correctly assert that this reflects the larger shift that had been
developing since the late 50s: the regime had recognized the need for a drastic change in
legitimacy, so they pivoted towards a positive economic message that still emphasized
nationalistic senses of duty, but also an emphasis on development.139
This coincided with Franco’s “25 Years of Peace” campaign. This was an aggressive
propaganda campaign in which the regime praised itself for being able to steer Spain through the
past twenty-five years without the significant internal strife it had faced in the 1930s.140 This,
coupled with the new economic messaging in education along with the indisputable fact that the
Spanish economy was improving, was the new pillar of Franco’s legitimacy.
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University enrollment increased in Spain during the 1960s, from 76,458 at the beginning
of the decade to 213,069 at its end.141 This period saw an intensification in student protests, over
one key issue in the years prior to 1965: the state mandated Falangist Spanish University Student
Union (SEU). Students who objected to the Falangist ideology furiously protested that all student
activities were run through this Falangist organization.142 The government eventually capitulated
and scrapped the SEU in favor of the Professional Student Associations (APE) in 1965. Students
saw this as a renaming of the SEU, and protested against its implementation, and in favor of free
unions such as the Democratic Students Union.143 The culminated in a return of radical and
dissenting ideologies, as the freedom of expression contained implications for the resurgence of
free political thought, which damaged Franco’s control on the political conversation in Spain.
Joaquim “Quim” Boix was born in Catalonia in 1945 to two public school teachers and
was part of this protest movement in the 1960s. Boix’s parents were lucky enough to survive the
educator purge after the war, as both his mother and father served as public school teachers in
both the Republic and the dictatorship. In his testimony, Boix says:
“I don’t know what age I was when I started [becoming aware of the dictatorship and
Franco] My parents said nothing about politics. The only politics I remember is that they
would turn on the News, they would watch Franco speak, he would finish with ‘long live
Spain’ and then they would turn off the news. They would also listen to the radio… I
started taking an interested in politics when I was around 15, when my older brother, who
was also at the Lycée Français became involved with anti-Franco movements, the
Communist movement…My parents always insisted that we not participate in political
activities. They fought against us taking part in anti-Franco activities.” 144
His parents, understandably cautious people, were mortified as Boix and his brothers joined
Communist movements when they went off to university. This testimony displays the notion that
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young people in Spain did not fear Franco as their parents did, and that they possessed a
willingness to act against the government, rather than passively dissent from the regime.
As for Franco, as the 1970s approached, he was most concerned on naming a successor.
The relationship with the Church had broken down due to Vatican II and the generational
rebellion within the clergy, therefore Franco could not count on the support of Spain’s behemoth
social institutions. Those close him had realized that the Spain Franco had once conquered had
changed drastically.145 It became clear that no simple Franco crony could uphold his NationalCatholic dictatorship because of this, the power vacuum that came with Franco’s approaching
demise would certainly lack the gravitas that Franco posed. Thus, the dictatorship would
inevitably die with him. There was not enough coordinated opposition to overthrow Franco, so it
is false to suggest that this was a possibility. Although his dictatorship was easing into its
demise, Franco would hear no part of a democracy. Thus, he organized for Juan Carlos, the
grandson of Spain’s last king, to take power upon Franco’s death.146
As protest culture in universities persisted the government worked to make itself a close
partner to the rest of Western Europe while Franco receded into silence. His government suffered
from a crisis of authority, as the Church was still at odds with the regime and once unthinkable
political statements such as strikes, officially illegal, increased in frequency. Franco was growing
weaker as the years went by, as he was now into his eighties. Spain found itself in an odd
political purgatory: they grew defiant of their decrepit dictator but lacked the resolve to remove
him or his bedrock apparatus.
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Franco’s old age did not help his public image. Spaniards often referred to Franco as
having “the gift of a young tortoise” as they poked fun at his deteriorating state and the fact, he
would not die a short death. The crux of political humor and public image hinged on his decrepit
state, his prolonged existence in a body that had seemed to run its course long ago, and his
increasing out of touch speeches.147 As the end of October 1975 rolled around, Franco’s death
was inevitable. He was to be transferred home to die in the comfort of his family. These plans
were thwarted by a massive gastric hemorrhage, and subsequently underwent three surgeries. At
this point Franco was fully sedated and died on the morning of November 20th, 1975.
Conclusion
On October 1st, 1975, Franco, in one of his last public appearances, addressed an adoring
crowd of around 300,000 supporters and millions more watching on television. Despite his
decaying physique, he was able to speak to them from the balcony of the Pardo Royal Palace in
Madrid. Flanked by Juan Carlos, Franco addressed the ever-relevant topic of international free
masonry and proclaimed that Spain was under attack from Marxism and communism. He called
these attacks “insidious and cowardly.”148 Although his followers certainly felt as though these
were concerns of the utmost importance, it is clear that Spain was facing much more pressing
issues.149
As has been shown, Franco set out to craft Spain’s education system around propping up
his own legitimacy. He felt as through the Church, since they had a monopoly on educational
policy prior to the Second Republic, was his natural ally in his quest to build upon his
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authoritarian foundation. Ideally, dissent would become a non-issue for Franco, as the youth of
Spain would become indoctrinated and Franco’s National-Catholic dictatorship would long
outlive him. However, this was not the case, as his dictatorship died with him.
The National-Catholic education system did not establish a significant new base of
support for Francoist entities, nor did it prevent damaging dissent. The Nationalists led a
campaign of liquidation against the Republic, and while this was not always done through
execution or murder, the intention was clearly to eradicate the core ideas of Spanish
Republicanism. Although it is unclear whether or not Franco wished to commit, or to what
degree he took place in, mass murder, he clearly caused collective fear among the Spanish
public. As shown in oral history testimony, survivors of the war who were not affiliated with
Nationalists viewed crossing Franco as a death sentence. Fear and repression were what Franco’s
dictatorship were based on; it is clear from examining the regime’s early education policy that
the regime was not interested in establishing a continuing historical narrative of terror. Rather,
they were focused on creating a new base of support that would bolster its legitimacy through
ridged indoctrination.
The importance of historical narrative cannot be understated when examining the Franco
regime, especially when looking at its unraveling. As Spanish youth came of age, they knew less
of war and more of oppression, and certainly did not feel fear to the extent their parents and
grandparents had. As they were taught the National-Catholic curriculum in school, it was clear
that the Spanish youth did not feel an outward sense of connection to the dictatorship as their
education hoped to achieve. Instead, their pollical influence was more focused on factors outside
of the classroom, as did not feel that they must accept the abject poverty or class disparities they
were set to inherit. As their textbooks instructed them to obey without question, the harsh
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conditions and political repression would entice them to defy their teachings. Because they did
not fear Franco and because the education system was ineffective in perpetuating indoctrination,
there was no reason for the Spanish youth in the 1950s to hesitate to dissent from the regime, as
shown by open student protests and testimony. The stark contrast between the political activism
of the generations removed from the Civil War and their politically silent parents proves that the
Franco Regime’s attempts to build support were misguided, as perhaps they would be better off
establishing a fear based historical narrative of the war. Franco did recognize that his education
system was failing to achieve his goal, but the evidence shows the damage was irreparable by
this time. His government went through several new Education Ministers, all of whom failed to
reform the system adequate as protests and dissent grew bolder.
The Church, Franco’s most steadfast ally, became a source of criticism and strife. They
were not exempt from the backlash towards the regime resulting from the lack of a historical
narrative, as a generational divide amongst priests saw younger clerics become more empathetic
towards the struggles of working poor Spaniards and openly critique the Franco regime. This,
coupled with Vatican II, pulled the rug out from under the regime, as their oldest and more
powerful ally began to distance themselves. Franco ended their relationship in the education
policy realm, pulling Christian imagery from their state approved textbooks.
Spain is currently embroiled in a memory war, where debates rage on how exactly Franco
should be remembered: keeping in mind the importance of this debate, one should not discuss the
history of 20th century Spain without speaking on the importance of the lack of a historical
narrative produced by the regime of the Civil War. Franco failed to understand that his
legitimacy came from terror, he only understood from where he wanted it to be derived: through
unquestioned and adoring loyalty to him, as the textbooks show. This is even seen in his official
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title: El Caudillo. The origins of this name go back to the reconquest of Spain, as El Caudillo was
someone who was worthy or wielding both pollical and military might, with the help of his
adoring supporters.150 Clearly Franco viewed himself in this light. Apart from devoted fanatics,
Spain’s population would never view him in this light, as his shortcomings were evident in every
hungry child and unemployed parent in the Spanish countryside. Thus, I can conclude that
Franco failed to solve the generational gap in memory of his core legitimacy, which was based
on the fact that he was seen as a brutal tyrant who had the power to kill them in an instant, with
their soul being left in purgatory while their body was thrown in an unmarked mass grave.
Franco died in 1975 without his National-Catholic vision for Spain coming to fruition.
Thousands of dissenting young people looked forward to a future without Franco. His successor,
chosen because his father was too liberal, would lead Spain into democracy, and elections were
held in 1977.151 Also in 1977, the ongoing memory war began, when the new Spanish parliament
passed the 1977 Amnesty Law, which codified the government’s “Pact of Forgetting.” This law
freed all political prisoners and those who were exiled by the Franco regime. However, it also
guaranteed that the Spanish government could not punish any person who committed crimes in
the name of Franco’s regime.152 This was seen at the time as a simple reconciliation, a necessary
step in Spain’s path back to democracy and a significant deviation from the past when political
differences were settled by violence. There were, however, several issues with this renewed
culture of silence, as there was a severe lack of accountability for the perpetrators of Franco’s
crimes. Along with this, monuments to the dictator still stood all throughout Spain. The most
infamous, the Valley of the Fallen, was built by prisoners of war, and housed Franco’s remains
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until 2019 when they were relocated as a result of protests and changes in government policy in
the 2007 law of historical memory which provided for some reconciliation for victims.153
When looking at the prominent debate regarding the pact of forgetting and Spain’s
current struggle on how to completely absolve themselves of Franco’s decades in power, one
must again look to the lack of historical narrative about the regime. The Pact of Forgetting
created a vacuum in the place a robust discussion on how best to move on from the dark days of
Franco and into democracy. Instead, the mass “forgetting” of Civil War created the memory war.
This was comparable to Franco’s own failure to establish a common history of the Civil War.
Given the prevalence of historical memory in Spanish public life, it is important that
historians take memory into account when studying the Franco regime and the return to
democracy. This thesis has sufficiently proven that the lack of historical memory surrounding the
most consequential period in 20th century Spanish history, the Civil War, created a vacuum even
when information was tightly controlled by the Regime. If historians were to take the approach
of considering historical memory, many useful insights could be made to inform current issues in
Spain. In addition, scholars may wish to explore the impact external factors had on the Regime.
Such factors could include the peculiarity of being a right-wing dictatorship in a Western Europe
on the verge of European integration.
In his abovementioned last speech, Franco railed international communism and critiqued
Free Masonry, a testament to how far out of touch the dictator was. These are simply the
ramblings of a senile dying old man reminiscing of his glory days to a crowd of sycophants.
However, I believe that Franco’s last speech provides further evidence to show that Franco, to a
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certain degree, was out of touch with all aspects of his rule. Franco never did understand that the
whole of the Spanish population could not love him in the way his supporters did, as is
evidenced though actions such as this. His foolhardy attempts to indoctrinate them to think
otherwise would prove fruitless. Franco’s greatest misunderstanding was his lack of interest in
historical memory of his repression and terror, as this is what drove his ability to rule, and his
greatest failure was that he chose not to educate accordingly.
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